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RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE COURTROOM: JUSTICE AND 
JUDGEMENT IN AMERICAN CULTURE. By w. Lance Bennett and 
Martha S. Feldman. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University 
Press. 1981. Pp. x, 203. $14.50. 
The criminal trial is a complex procedure, governed by a multitude of 
seemingly irreconcilable technical rules. Judges and lawyers, in addition to 
their legal education, often spend years mastering courtroom language and 
procedures. Despite these complexities, the American criminal justice sys-
tem thrusts uninitiated laymen into the jury box and requires them to make 
judgments with grave consequences. The questions of how jurors adapt to 
this new environment and render decisions of guilt and innocence have 
been the subject of considerable study.1 In Reconstructing Reality in the 
Courtroom, social scientists W. Lance Bennett and Martha S. Feldman the-
orize that the key to understanding the criminal jury's decision-making pro-
cess is an every-day communication device - the story.2 
Understanding how the story enables the actors in a criminal trial to 
communicate sensibly and to perform their roles properly can clear up 
"several of the mysteries surrounding criminal trials" (pp. 4-5). For exam-
ple, it is unclear how jurors assimilate vast amounts of technical informa-
tion, when lawyer behavior significantly affects trial outcome, and how bias 
subtly infiltrates the judicial.process (pp. 5-6). Bennett and Feldman argue 
that "[d]espite that maze of legal jargon, lawyers' mysterious tactics, and 
obscure court procedures, any criminal case can be reduced to the simple 
form of a story" (p. 4). Unfortunately, there is no such simple device to help 
lawyers decipher the "maze of social science jargon" in which the authors 
mask the answers to these mysteries. 
The book is divided into four parts. In Parts I and II, Bennett and Feld-
man explain why stories are appropriate tools to assist jurors in organizing 
information and how they are used to do so. Familiar literary devices, such 
as flashbacks, fl.ash-forwards, and subplots enable jurors to incorporate 
complex, disjointed, and conflicting testimony into a coherent scenario. 
Grammar conventions, such as verb tense and pronoun usage, further help 
jurors to assimilate information and to identify the central action. Juries 
also draw on their ''vast store of background knowledge about social life" 
(p. 50) to make inferences where gaps or ambiguities exist. Jurors then inte-
grate the central action, the surrounding actions, and their background 
knowledge, to interpret the overall story. Finally, the jury evaluates the five 
I. See, e.g., M. GLEISSER, JURIES AND JUSTICE 217-67 (1968); H. KALVEN, JR. & H. 
ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966); Adler, Socioeconomic Factors Il!lfuencing Jury Verdicts, 
3 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 1 (1973); Costopoulos, Persuasion in the Courtroom, 10 
DUQ. L. REV. 89 (1972); Forston, Sense and Non-Sense: Jury Trial Communication, 1975 
B.Y.U. L. REV. 601; Wasserman & Robinson, Extra-Legal Influences, Group Process, and Jury 
.Decision-Making: A Psychological Perspective, 12 N.C. CENT. L.J. 96 (1980). 
2. The authors define a story as "simply a communicational form that provides for the 
development, climax, and denouement of action in the context of a defined collection of actors, 
motives, and scenes." P. 7. 
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elements of the story (scene, act, agent, agency, and purpose) for complete-
ness and consistency (p. 62). 
Throughout the book, but particularly in Part II, Bennett and Feldman 
rely on intricate and technical arguments to support their theory that "the 
structure of a story can be just as important as its documentation" (p. 67). 
Readers lacking a strong social science background may find the discussion 
in Part II only marginally intelligible. Readers trained in law may pref er to 
concentrate on Chapter 1, where the authors lay out their theory, and then 
jump directly to Part III, where the authors apply their theory to the crimi-
nal trial.3 
In Part III, Bennett and Feldman shift their focus from the jury to the 
lawyers. Because juries process information through the use of stories, the 
authors argue, lawyers must be sensitive to the structure of the story they 
present to the jury. In his intructions to the jury, the judge identifies the 
elements of the crime with which the defendant is charged. The authors 
equate these elements to the five structural elements of a story. Because the 
government bears the burden of proof in a criminal trial, the need to fash-
ion "a structurally complete and internally consistent story that [considers] 
all the evidence" (p. 97), dictates the prosecution's trial strategy. 
The defense, on the other hand, shapes its strategy according to the 
structural strengths and weaknesses of the prosecution's story. When the 
prosecution fails to present a complete story, the defense employs the "chal-
lenge strategy." The defense points out the gaps or inconsistencies in the 
prosecution's theory through cross-examination and closing statements. 
When the prosecution's story is complete, but contains an ambiguous cen-
tral element, the defense relies on the "redefinition strategy." If the de-
fense can disrupt several connections in the prosecution's account of the 
relevant facts by redefining a key element, the resulting inconsistencies can 
render that account suspect. When the prosecution's story is structurally 
sound and unambiguous, but fails to incorporate a large amount of evi-
dence, the defense counters with the "reconstruction strategy." This strat-
egy "involves placing the central action in the context of an entirely new 
story to show that it merits a different interpretation" (p. 104). 
The effect of each side's strategy upon the jury depends upon "the care-
ful development and use of tactics" (p. 116). Each lawyer may make hun-
dreds of tactical moves during the course ofa trial. Although many of these 
moves may be captivating and dramatic, only those that affect the develop-
ment of the chosen strategy are likely to influence the outcome. Bennett 
and Feldman identify three influential trial tactics. Through "definitional 
tactics," lawyers elicit precise answers from witnesses "to narrow the possi-
ble definitions of evidence to just the ones that fit" (p. 118) their story strat-
egy. "Inferential tactics" enable lawyers to establish connections that fit 
loose bits of evidence into the central action to create a consistently struc-
tured story. Through ''validation tactics," lawyers strengthen their evidence 
3. The authors' "theory emerged gradually over the course of more than a year of ethno-
graphic study of criminal trials in the Superior Court of the state of Washington in King 
County (Seattle), Washington. P. 11. They observed over sixty criminal trials and studied the 
transcripts of forty trials. Additionally, two videotapes of actual trials were made available to 
them. 
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by pointing out consistent evidence elsewhere in the story and by establish-
ing the credibility of the witness. Lawyers who master these tactics, the 
authors argue, can improve the likelihood of a favorable verdict. 
In Part IV, Bennett and Feldman use the story framework to bring co-
herence to the fragmented body of current literature addressing bias in the 
courtroom. The authors acknowledge that variables such as racial 
prejudice and the nature of the crime may influence jury decisionmaking. 
However, "[s]uch factors become relevant in trial only when they intersect 
with central judgmental issues in stories" (p. 149). While social prejudices 
cannot be eliminated, 
if we can identify the cognitive-communicational structure of legal judge-
ment, then it should be possible to detect story strategies that make extra-
neous factors more or less likely to enter judgements. If such story 
characteristics can be monitored, then it should be possible to make formal 
rulings about the acceptability of cases to alert participants to the likeli-
hood that particular factors will enter judgement in a particular case. [P. 
149.] 
Bias, then, involves more than some prejudice against a particular party. 
To be significant, bias must also operate in the jury's understanding of the 
facts. 
The reliance on storytelling in the courtroom can bias jurors despite 
their sincere efforts to make impartial decisions. Individuals who lack the 
communication skills to produce a structurally sound story are less credible 
witnesses, even though they are telling the truth. Further, when a structur-
ally sound story is told, the jury may disbelieve the witness unless they 
"share the norms, experiences, and assumptions necessary to draw connec-
tions among story elements" (p. 171). The jury's inability to relate to a 
witness is the most threatening type of prejudice, since it is the most difficult 
to detect. 
While Reconstructing Reality in the Courtroom may be of interest to so-
cial scientists, its value to the legal profession is limited. Its most apparent 
limitation is the complex social science vernacular in which its analysis is 
cast. A more significant limitation, however, is its failure to provide any 
new advice on how to improve the criminal justice system. The most prac-
tical advice offered is that lawyers should realize that cultural differences 
between witness and jurors can lead to breakdowns in communication. 
This, however, is scarcely a new concern.4 The book does little more than 
impose an obscure description on familiar phenomena, implying the neces-
sary but erroneous message that those who master the authors' vocabulary 
will thereby gain an understanding of the courtroom that only experience 
can provide. 
4. See Note, The Jury: A Reflection of the Prejudices of the Community, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 
1417, 1418 (1969) ("Cultural differences - ignorance of mores, language, life styles - com-
pound the jury problem where defendants are not from the predominant socio-economic 
group, particularly where racial differences are present."). The Note goes on to use the same 
example used by Bennett and Feldman (p. 181)- the defendant who had been put "in the 
dozens." Id. at 1419. 
LEGAL PSYCHOLOGY: EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY - JURY BEHAVIOR. 
By L. Craig Parker. Springfield, Ill.: Charles C Thomas. 1980. Pp. 
vii, 185. $22.75. 
In Legal Psychology, L. Craig Parker presents an overview of the legal 
and psychological concepts of eyewitness testimony and jury behavior. The 
author attempts to integrate the discipline of psychology into legal practice 
in order to overcome the reluctance of the legal profession to employ psy-
chological concepts. After a brief outline of the other contexts in which 
these disciplines interact, Parker examines a large volume of psychological 
research pertaining to two discrete areas - eyewitness testimony and jury 
behavior. As a complement to these studies, he reviews Supreme Court 
decisions relevant to these subjects. Unfortunately, his discussion only in-
frequently goes beyond this sum'llary format. Parker fails to suggest any 
guidelines for the practical application of psychology to the practice oflaw. 
Legal Psychology is, consequently, unlikely to have a significant impact on 
either psychological or legal literature. 
Parker first attempts to provide some background on the interface of 
law and psychology. He begins by briefly summarizing the legal-psycho-
logical overlap involved in areas ranging from eyewitness testimony to legal 
socialization. This is followed by a historical survey of those psychological 
studies with legal implications. This somewhat haphazard section leaves 
the lay reader overwhelmed, not only by the large number of studies sur-
veyed, but also by their tenuous relevance to the book's subject matter. Al-
though this survey may be of interest to psychologists, it is too unwieldly to 
be of use to lawyers. Parker does underscore the undeserved nature of the 
legal field's ambivalence towards psychology, but, in general, this overview 
of the interface fails to give the lay reader the intended background. 
Parker then examines the field of eyewitness testimony in detail. His 
thesis throughout is that the present legal rules ignore the research conclu-
sions: judges and juries are insensitive to the inaccuracies that are part of 
most eyewitness testimony (p. 30). Parker finds it incongruous that the ju-
diciary continues to stress the weight of eyewitness testimony when both 
experimentation and actual mistaken identifications demonstrate that this 
testimony is frequently inaccurate. 
Parker focuses on the variables that might result in differing eyewitness 
testimony for identical situations. Unfortunately, these variables, which 
range from race to religion, sex to socioeconomic background, are 
presented through an unorganized series of experimental results. 1 Parker 
underlines an experimental variable as affecting eyewitness testimony and 
applies his talent for criticism to the experiment's methodology. This leaves 
the reader confused as to the actual significance of these variables. A sec-
tion on the importance of these variables and their applicability to the legal 
I. One reviewer indicates that Parker's list of experiments was not comprehensive and 
omitted studies that had contributed significantly to this particular field. See Wells, Gaps and 
Canyons in Psycho-Lego/ Research (Book Review), 27 CONTEMP. PSYCH. 55, 56 (1982). 
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issues surrounding eyewitness testimony2 would have been helpful. The 
judiciary is unlikely to adopt psychological principles without guidelines 
for accurately doing so. 
This failure to provide direction is even more apparent in Parker's sec-
tion on memory testing. The research in this area presents excellent pos-
sibilities for practical application in a legal context. Parker surveys studies 
ranging from the effect of mug shot displays on memory retention (interfer-
ence) to tests on the comparative accuracy of identification between artist's 
sketches and composite portraits. An experiment on the number of incor-
rect identifications resulting from the nonverbal cues of the person con-
ducting the trial identification seems, for example, an obvious candidate for 
legal implementation. Parker again declines the opportunity to summarize 
this psychological data in a way that would indicate a direction for legal 
reform. 
Parker does attempt, through Supreme Court decisions,3 to illustrate the 
legal perspective on eyewitness testimony. He finds that the decisions fluc-
tuate from excellent analyses applying recent psychological studies4 to deci-
sions based solely on intuition. 5 A case not discussed by Parker 
underscores his frustration with legal rulings. In United States v. Crews6 
the Cou1t, without the benefit of psychological studies, held that a witness' 
courtroom identification rested on an independent recollection and was not 
the result of illegally obtained pretrial identification.7 The research in this 
area, however, indicates that the initial identification becomes a reinforce-
ment for all future identifications. The illegal pretrial identification would 
then prejudice the defendant at trial (p. 110). This supports Parker's theme 
that the courts often ignore or reject the findings of experimental 
psychology. 
Yet Parker again fails to provide proposals to remedy the deficiencies. 
He points out that the Court has attempted to safeguard defendants by re-
quiring the presence of a lawyer at the identification. The lawyer, however, 
is unlikely to know how to protect his client in this situation. Parker 
stresses the prejudice and bias which pervades many identifications, but he 
fails to provide practical instruction for the lawyer who has a client in a 
lineup. Parker merely discusses suggestions, such as videotaped lineups, 
made by other commentators without recommending any (pp. 110-15). 
Parker thus adds very little to the understanding or prevention of inac-
curate eyewitness identifications. Legal commentators have long recog-
nized the unreliability of this sort oftestimony.8 The key legal problem-
2. Parker has been criticized for failing to discriminate between variables that can be used 
in a practical context and those that have only questionable value for those in the legal field. 
Id at 56. 
3. Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220 (1977); United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973); Kirby 
v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1973); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 
388 U.S. 263 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). 
4. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228-36 (1967). 
5. See Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220 (1977). 
6. 44S U.S. 463 (1980). 
7. 445 U.S. at 473. 
8. See, e.g., E. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (1932); E. LOFrUS, EYEWITNESS 
TESTIMONY (1979); P. WALL, EYE-WITNESS IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES (1965); Le-
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devising procedures to reduce the risks of erroneous identifications without 
crippling criminal law enforcement - has already been resourcefully un-
dertaken by other observers.9 The need, therefore, is less for another dem-
onstration that eyewitness testimony is suspect than for the political 
determination to do something about it. Parker's book is highly unlikely to 
contribute to this last objective. 
Parker next examines the research and legal practice on jury decision 
rules. After a succinct review of the Supreme Court cases on jury size and 
unanimous decisions, 10 Parker again enters the realm of psychological liter-
ature.11 He emphasizes that when the courts have used psychological stud-
ies in their rationale, they have often relied on research of limited 
credibility. Parker does an excellent job of pointing out the weaknesses in 
the experiments on jury decision rules. Weaknesses include the homogene-
ity of the subject sample (frequently college students) as opposed to the 
heterogeneous sample required for jury selection, and the inherent differ-
ences between deciding a hypothetical case and an actual case. Again, the 
thorough criticism of these psychological hypotheses leaves the reader inse-
cure as to their importance. The overall thrust of the results is that the 
decisions of a six-person jury and a non unanimous twelve-person jury may 
infringe upon a defendant's rights. Parker stresses, however, that because 
of "outstanding weaknesses" these studies are of questionable value to the 
judiciary (p. 141). This subject, however, does illustrate the promise of ex-
perimental research on legal issues. Parker emphasizes the limitations of 
this research without minimizing psychology's potential. The reader is left 
with the hope that future research may resolve the lingering uncertainty. 
Parker also analyzes some of the research on jury behavior. He divides 
his analysis into two sections. First he reviews the studies on nonlegal fac-
tors, such as sex, race and status, that can influence jury decisions. Unfor-
tunately, the data generated by these studies seems too piecemeal to 
advance knowledge much beyond the intuitive level. Parker's next section, 
on the use of social scientists in jury selection, reinforces this skepticism. He 
comments on the legal arguments espousing the dangers of stacking the 
jury. Parker, however, hesitates to give any credence to the alleged benefits 
of experimental psychology to jury selection procedures. Lawyers should 
note that in order for psychological techniques to have any significant ef-
fect, the psychologist must have an unusually comprehensive background 
in this area and the evidence must be sufficiently ambiguous for jury biases 
to influence the ultimate decision. Until further developments occur in this 
vine & Tapp, The Psychology of Criminal Identification: The Gap ftom Wade to Kirby, 121 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1079 (1973). 
9. See, e.g., Sobel,Assailing the Impermissible Suggestion: Evolving Limitations on the Abuse 
of Pre-Trial Criminal Identification Methods, 38 BROOKLYN L. REV. 261 (1971) (suggesting, 
among other things, "blank lineups" - lineups in which the suspect does not initially 
participate). 
10. Recent cases that Parker does not include in his discussion are Burch v. Louisiana, 441 
U.S. 130 (1979) (The Court held that the provisions of the Louisiana Constitution that permit-
ted nonunanimous six-person jury decisions were unconstitutional.), and Brown v. Louisiana, 
447 US. 323 (1980) (The Court held that the decision in Burch was retroactive.). 
II. Wells suggests that psychologists may find M. SAKS, JURY VERDICTS (1977), a more 
thorough work on jury behavior. Wells, supra note I, at 56. 
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field, Parker suggests that the intuition of the individual lawyer may be just 
as productive a tool for jury selection as experimental psychology. 
An additional chapter tying these loose ends of psychological research 
together would be useful to both lawyers and psychologists. While Parker 
bemoans the reluctance of lawyers to use psychology, the reader is left un-
sure of what Parker feels should be psychology's contribution to the law. 
He outlines flaws in the research, but does not deal directly with the con-
cerns of lawyers. A legitimate concern is that psychological studies are 
oversimplified and, therefore, are not applicable to real life situations (p. 
17). As a summary of recent Supreme Court law and psychological studies, 
Parker's presentation is often unorganized. The reader is required to decide 
for himself which principles are relevant to the legal problems. The disci-
pline of legal psychology has a vast opportunity for selecting those experi-
mental results that are valid and designing methods of applying them to 
legal procedure. A better understanding of legal issues, however, is impor-
tant to any book hoping to influence psychology's effect on the law. Legal 
Psychology fails to address the concerns of lawyers, and hence fails in its 
intended goals. 12 
12. Parker's book is also reviewed by Wells, supra note 1. 
